The main reason for the formation of the group was secession. However, the precursor to this was the formation of a militant student body that was in protest of the continued limitation of Tamil students into the university by the government; this was in 1970. Within a short period, however, the group disappeared only to begin launching overt attacks and conducting terrorist activities in the larger Sri Lanka (Katz 1; Joshi 23). With time, the original group split into other factions though all had a common goal: create a separate Tamil state. However, the constitution published in 1972 created a fertile ground for attacks as the Tamil factions saw it as being largely anti-Tamil. This spurred the Tamils into action, and thus joined in the fight. In 1983, countrywide clashes with the Sinhalese that left thousands of Tamils dead saw the rise of the LTTE and the fight against the Sri Lankan government began (Swamy and Narayan 8; McConnell 61). As noted hereinabove, the LTTE had quite an elaborate command structure with almost all parts of a full government. They had a well-organized leadership that was structured along two tiers: the military and the political wings. There was a governing committee whose role was to oversee the running of both wings that was headed by Prabhakaran. This is the body mandated with controlling and directing several of the group’s subdivisions such as the airborne group, the navy, and the elite fighting wing. They also had a suicide commando unit and an intelligence unit aimed at gathering intelligence (Swamy and Narayan 12). They even had an international secretariat within the governing committee that was in charge of all global networks and communications.There was a truce in 2006 from the government after an onslaught carried out by government military, and this gave them a leeway to increase their strength by recruiting more than 11,000 guerrillas to increase the cadre. All the recruits had been indoctrinated to believe that they were fighting against an indiscriminate enemy that has no mercy on the people of Tamil in particular, and should thus show no mercy when they come in touch with them.
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